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Alvarado et al.: Regions

REgions
Americas
Fighting Terror with Terror:
Chile’s Targeting of the Mapuche
An arson attack on a home in Chile’s
southern Araucanía region, allegedly
carried out by members of the Mapuche
tribe, has led to the reimplementation
of a tough anti-terrorism law. After meeting with his cabinet ministers following
the attack, which took the lives of the
homeowners, Chilean President Sebastián
Piñera stated that the anti-terrorism law
is the country’s best option to combat
the attacks of the indigenous population on local landowners. The aim of the
law is to impose harsh penalties on domestic terrorists, but leaders of the Mapuche
tribe claim that the government is using
the law to target their population in a
discriminatory fashion.
The tension between the Mapuche and
the Chilean government has continued to
rise over the dispossession of land by state
officials to expand the forestry industry,
hydroelectric dams, and other corporations. The Mapuche tribe bases its claim
to the territory on ancestral connections
to the land. The Piñera administration has
refused to expropriate land to the indigenous population, and some members of
the tribe have resorted to targeting forestry
companies through arson attacks, land
occupations, seizures of timber stands, and
roadblocks. In response to these tactics,
the Chilean government imposed heavy
punishments on the Mapuche population
pursuant to the anti-terrorism law.
Law 18.314 was enacted in 1984 by
the Pinochet regime to suppress domestic
acts of terrorism and violent acts of armed
political groups. The law defines illegal
land occupation and attacks on equipment
or personnel of multinational corporations
as acts of terrorism that can be adjudicated
in civilian and military trials. It also allows
the state to rely on unidentified prosecution witnesses and indefinite detention for
suspected terrorists, along with the power to
tap telephones and intercept correspondence
such as e-mails and other communications.
The anti-terrorism law has been invoked

on numerous occasions as a result of
acts of arson in southern Chile, including
incidents in 2002 and 2010.

Chile that military jurisdiction over civilian
cases was inadequate to provide the basic
right to a fair trial.

The use of the anti-terrorism law has
The Mapuche have continued to be
faced scrutiny for a number of reasons inhibited by the Chilean state’s lack of
by the Mapuche tribe and international recognition for their ancestral lands. As
human rights groups, such as Minority Mapuche and other indigenous communiRights Group International and Human ties take increasingly desperate measures
Rights Watch. The due process rights to reclaim or maintain control over their
of Mapuche detainees have been threat- territory, the Chilean government has conened by the measures allowed under the tinued to use the anti-terrorism law as
anti-terrorism law. Pre-trial detention is a way to quell social movements in the
typically longer for a suspect under the Araucanía region. While the law aims to
anti-terrorism law than those charged with crack down on violence against landownother crimes in Chile, and sometimes ers in the region, Chile’s implementation
spans up until the beginning of trial. By of its anti-terrorism law has led to multiple
allowing courts to hold Mapuche suspects violations of due process and human rights
in custody until trial under Law 18.314, abuses against the Mapuche people. The
Chile is violating Article 9, Section 3 of the Chilean government must address these
United Nations International Covenant on issues if it plans to reach a successful
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which agreement over the territorial disputes.
states, “It shall not be the general rule that
tch Made in Rubble? Iran and
persons awaiting trial shall be detained
Argentina Seek the Truth in the AMIA
in custody.” In Giménez v. Argentina, the
Bombing
Inter-American Commission on HumanMa
Rights (IACHR) noted that holding
Argentine and Iranian officials recently
a defendant in indefinite or prolonged reached an agreement that will establish
pre-trial detention is a severe measure that an international committee aimed at invesshould only be employed as punishment tigating the long-standing dispute over the
to those convicted of a crime or to repeat deadly terrorist attack on the Asociación
offenders.
Mutual Israelita Argentina (Argentine
Israeli Mutual Association, AMIA) buildThe ability to use unidentified witnesses
ing. The July 18, 1994, attack left 85
by the prosecution is a violation of Article
people dead and hundreds more injured,
14(3)(e) of the ICCPR which guarantees the
constituting the deadliest bombing in
right of defendants to confront witnesses.
Argentine history. The violence was aimed
Under the anti-terrorism law, the prosecution
at members of the country’s Jewish popuis allowed to keep the identity of its witlation, one of the largest in Latin America
nesses secret. The police tactics used in
with nearly 200,000 Jewish citizens, and
implementing the anti-terrorism law gave
demands for justice were swift. Crippling
rise to many claims against the police
inefficiency and allegations of cover-ups
force, but because the military tribunals
have hampered the investigation of the
maintain jurisdiction over all cases dealing
attack and complicated the identification
with on-duty incidents, the Mapuche argue
of suspects.
they have little chance of recovering damages. The IACHR has also rejected military
As the search for culprits continued
tribunals as a way of trying civilians in its into 2006, Argentine prosecutor Alberto
1998 Annual Report. The use of military Nisman formally charged the Lebanontribunals in these cases is a violation of based Islamic militant group Hezbollah
the Fair Trial Guarantees of Article 14 that as the organization responsible for the
Chile adhered to in its ratification of the attack and implicated the Iranian govICCPR. Chile is also acting contrary to the ernment as assisting in carrying out the
Inter-American Court of Human Rights’ attack. This came after Argentine inteldetermination in Palamara-Iribarne v. ligence and the U.S. Federal Bureau of
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Investigation identified Ibrahim Hussein
Berro as the suicide bomber in the attack.
His connections with Hezbollah, a Shi’ite
political and militant organization, were
also uncovered during the investigation.
Although the prosecutor argued that Iran’s
motive in supporting the attack was based
on Argentina’s suspension of transferring technological information regarding
nuclear material, Iran continuously denies
any involvement in the AMIA bombing.

Argentina also views the truth commission as a way to ensure that individual
rights are properly protected. By moving
toward a new investigation, Argentina
follows the four steps that Special
Rapporteur Méndez highlights by seeking
that justice is achieved for the victims,
finding and disseminating the truth once
the commission completes its work,
and compensating the victims through
monetary and non-monetary means.

The Argentine government recently
approved a memorandum of understanding
with Iran to establish a truth commission for the AMIA bombing. President
Cristina Kirchner announced that the two
governments would establish an international commission—with no Iranian or
Argentine nationals as members—that will
recommend a way to proceed with the
investigation in Argentina as well as allow
Argentine officials to investigate in Iran.

AMIA and critics of the memorandum
argue that Argentine judges can already
travel to Iran to interview the suspects
without an agreement. Jewish groups
also argue that it is unconstitutional for
President Kirchner to be involved in a
judicial matter. Religious and social leaders of the Argentine Jewish community
have criticized the idea of allowing a truth
commission created by Iran, which they
suspect played a major role in the bombing, to develop recommendations for the
domestic legal framework to follow. Critics
note that allowing Iran to establish a truth
commission undermines Argentine jurisprudence if it finds that those charged with
the crime are not required to be questioned
or investigated by the international judges
selected by the memorandum.

President of the Argentine Foreign
Relations Committee Guillermo Carmona
noted that the memorandum is the only way
for Argentine legal officials to question
Iranians such as Gen Vahidi, the current
defense minister. The truth commission
aims to reexamine evidence from the
bombing to develop a due process model
for the accused in Iran, while also allowing Argentine investigators into Tehran
to conduct interrogations. The Argentine
government has continually experienced
difficulties in extraditing Iranian suspects
with Interpol warrants for their alleged
involvement in the bombing.
The creation of the truth commission
follows an emerging norm in the international community of prosecuting massive
and systematic human rights violations.
As noted by UN Special Rapporteur on
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and
Degrading Treatment or Punishment Juan
E. Méndez, states have an obligation to
respond to crimes against humanity, such
as the bombing in Argentina. These obligations include investigating, prosecuting,
and punishing perpetrators; disclosing to
victims, their families and societies all
information about the events; offering victims adequate reparations; and separating
the known perpetrators from positions
of authority. Argentina’s push for collaboration adheres to its responsibility of
diligently meeting these four requirements
of accountability.

President Kirchner has argued that
the agreement is the only way to gain
needed access to Iranian officials. She has
some support from groups like Amnesty
International Argentina, which hailed the
agreement as a way to move forward
toward justice and reparations. However,
members of the political opposition have
asserted that the Iranian-created commission
will function as a way to grant impunity
to Iranian officials.
By attempting to work with Iran,
Argentina seeks to meet its obligations of
means and not results. Special Rapporteur
Méndez explained that these obligations
are subject to conditions of legitimacy in
their performance, so even if the officials
who are investigated are acquitted, as long
as the judicial process was committed in
good faith, then Argentine officials have
met their obligation. This justice must
coincide with not only the truth being
presented to victims, but also effective
measures to prosecute those responsible.
Argentina’s shift toward the creation of an
instrument of accountability moves them
away from a “forgive and forget” mindset
that has resulted in amnesty for violators of
57

human rights that were found responsible
for atrocities. The effectiveness of the truth
commission will ultimately depend not
only on its ability to find the truth, but to
also use it to find justice.
Ernesto Alvarado, a J.D. candidate
at the American University Washington
College of Law, is a staff writer for the
Human Rights Brief.

Abuse in Guatemalan Psychiatric
Hospital May Amount to Torture
Psychiatric patients are often considered
among the most vulnerable populations,
largely as a result of a psychiatric patient’s
powerlessness once placed under the control of another person. This vulnerability
can be illustrated through a recent investigation of a Guatemalan psychiatric facility
that produced alarming results. Human
rights groups—including Disability Rights
International—conducted a month-long
study of psychiatric hospital conditions
across Latin America in November 2012.
Conclusions indicated that, of a dozen
hospitals examined, the Federico Mora
Hospital in Guatemala City exhibited the
most deplorable conditions. The Federico
Mora Hospital is the only national, public
psychiatric hospital in Guatemala. The
investigation revealed incidents of severe
neglect, abuse, and outright denial of medical treatment for many patients. Moreover,
approximately 300 children were held in
solitary confinement, a practice the international community condemns, especially
when used for young children. Patients also
reported incidents of sexual and physical
abuse, identifying that the perpetrators
include hospital staff and inmates from an
adjacent prison. Although some hospital staff
members are aware of the abuse committed
against patients, the perpetuated climate of
fear has resulted in unreported crimes that
inevitably encourage further abuse.
The Guatemalan government ratified
the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons
with Disabilities (CRPD) in 2009. Article
15 of the CRPD provides that persons with
disabilities shall not be subjected to torture
or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment
or punishment. Furthermore, Article 16
states that persons with disabilities shall
be free from exploitation, violence, and
abuse. As a State Party to the CRPD,
the Guatemalan government’s adherence
to both of these provisions is suspect,
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especially in light of the reported grave
conditions at Federico Mora hospital.
The Guatemalan government has
also ratified the UN Convention Against
Torture (CAT). The treaty enforcement
body of the CAT, the UN Committee
Against Torture, has established that “each
State party should prohibit, prevent and
redress torture and ill-treatment in all
contexts of custody or control, for example,
in prisons, hospitals, schools, [and] institutions that engage in the care of children,
the aged, the mentally ill or disabled.” The
obligation to prevent torture extends to doctors, health-care professionals, and social
workers, including those working in private
hospitals, detention centers, and other institutions. UN Special Rapporteur on Torture
and Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading
Treatment or Punishment Juan E. Méndez,
concluded in a recent report on abuses
in health-care settings that “[m]edical
care that causes severe suffering for no
justifiable reason can be considered cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, and if there is State involvement and
specific intent, it is torture.” Furthermore,
the Special Rapporteur determined that
prolonged seclusion may constitute torture
and ill-treatment.
In response to the allegations of rampant
human rights violations in Federico Mora
Hospital, the Inter-American Commission
on Human Rights (IACHR, Commission)
requested precautionary measures for the
patients of the Federico Mora hospital in
November 2009. The Commission urged
the Guatemalan government to take “[i]
mmediate preventive measures aimed at
protecting all patients, particularly women
and children, from physical, psychological
and sexual violence by other inmates,
guards and hospital staff.” Further, the
Commission called on the government
to relocate patients to community-based
facilities in hopes that such facilities will
respect disabled persons’ right to physical
and mental integrity. Community-based
alternatives also prevent segregation and
exclusion from society, decreasing the
likelihood of the vulnerability experienced
in psychiatric hospitals like Federico Mora.
Dr. Miguel Alejandro De León, Federico
Mora’s Head of Forensic Psychiatry,
acknowledged some of the hospital’s problems, yet denied the extensive findings of
the human rights groups. According to Dr.
De León, a proposed solution is to create

a separate facility for patients who have
been criminally charged and who allegedly
commit most of the abuses. However,
such a solution inadequately addresses
the deplorable conditions and practices
employed by hospital staff.
As a State Party to both the CRPD and
the CAT, the Guatemalan government is
legally obligated to ensure the mental and
physical integrity of all its citizens, including the patients of Federico Mora Hospital.
The Commission has requested that the
government take several immediate steps
to address the situation, including providing appropriate medical care, adopting
measures to prevent abuse against patients,
and separating children from adults. A
failure to address known abuse and neglect
may be further evidence of abuse that
amounts to torture, thus placing the government at even greater risk of falling
short of its international obligations.

Keystone XL Pipeline Poses
Significant Threat to Health of
Already Vulnerable Communities
The proposed TransCanada Keystone
XL Pipeline risks endangering U.S. fresh
water sources and the public health of
surrounding communities due to probable
“dirty” oil spills and the environmental
impacts of transporting oil that produces
three to four more times greenhouse gas
emissions than conventional oil. These
adverse consequences will reportedly
disproportionately affect the health and
safety of minority and low-income communities, including a predominately black
and Latino neighborhood in Port Arthur,
Texas. The pipeline will transport some
of the dirtiest oil, linking tar sands oil of
western Canada to refineries and ports
in Texas along the Gulf Coast. Tar sands
oil is highly acidic and corrosive and
is considered the most toxic fossil fuel
on the planet.
Indigenous people living in Fort
Chipewyan in Northern Alberta, Canada,
where tar sands oil is extracted, report the
oil is linked to staggering hikes in cancer
rates as a result of living downstream
from tar sands production. In response
to ongoing serious health concerns, Cora
Voyageur, a sociology professor from the
University of Calgary, recently launched
an independent study to assess the health
effects of these oil sands on nearby
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communities, including other health issues
like autism.
The proposed Keystone XL Pipeline
will cross key sources of drinking and
agricultural water, including the Ogallala
Aquifer that supplies fresh water for
two million people in eight U.S. states.
Environmental activists warn that the
pipeline will pose a threat to the aquifer,
which is considered one of the world’s
largest underground sources of fresh water.
Due to the close proximity of the pipeline
with some parts of the aquifer, coupled
with the high risks of oil spills, many are
concerned about the likelihood of water
contamination.
TransCanada’s first tar sands pipeline,
Keystone I, commenced operations in 2010
and experienced fourteen leaks within its
first year. Shortly thereafter, the U.S. government issued a Corrective Action Order
to temporarily shut down pipeline operations, finding that “the continued operation
of the pipeline without corrective measures would be hazardous to life, property
and the environment.” Although operations
restarted, the pipeline has repeatedly been
shut down due to the frequency of oil
spills. Despite TransCanada’s projections
of only five spills over a fifty-year span, as
of October 2012, at least thirty-five spills
have occurred. Thus, initial projections
were grossly underestimated, a fact which
increases concerns as the U.S. government
considers approval of the XL pipeline.
The proposed pipeline is currently
pending a federal permit from the U.S.
Department of State (DOS). In March 2013,
the DOS released a draft Supplemental
Environmental Impact Statement for the
proposed pipeline that, according to the
Sierra Club, understates the adverse risks
to Americans’ water and air, as well as
the human health of nearby communities.
Rather, the report focuses largely on prospective job creation and American energy
independence, minimizing potential
adverse impacts the pipeline will have on
the climate or the health of U.S. residents.
The International Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination (ICERD) provides in
Article 5(d)(iv) that a State Party must
guarantee the right of everyone, without
distinction as to race, color, or national or
ethnic origin, to equal enjoyment to the
right to public health. Both Canada and
the United States have ratified the ICERD,
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thereby obligating the countries to protect
their citizens from significant public
health risks. Article 25(1) of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR)
also provides that “everyone has the right
to a standard of living adequate for the
health and well-being of himself and his
family.” Although the UDHR initially was
not viewed as a legally binding document,
it has gained an authoritative force encompassing international human rights norms.
Moreover, in 2010, a resolution of the UN
Human Rights Council (HRC) recognized
the right to water and sanitation as legally
binding for all Member States.
Despite growing concerns about public health and safety, coupled with the
poor track record of TransCanada’s first
tar sands pipeline, the U.S. government
continues to consider approving the
pipeline. In light of the various negative
impacts from construction, potential oil
spills, climate change, and health risks,
the government is legally obligated to
ensure that all persons have access to clean
and safe water and do not face adverse
health conditions as a result of the project.
Approval of the Keystone XL Project will
likely jeopardize both the United States
and Canada’s compliance with ICERD and
the HRC’s resolution, posing a significant
threat to some of America’s already vulnerable communities. Health risks of nearby
low-income neighborhoods heighten concerns about the project’s disproportionate
effect on minorities. Moreover, access
to safe drinking water is further endangered due to the environmental impacts of
transporting dirty oil.
Diana Damschroder, a J.D. candidate
at the American University Washington
College of Law, is a staff writer for the
Human Rights Brief.

Asia and Oceania
Central Asia: Balancing National
Security with Freedom of Religion
Since September 11, 2001 all five
Central Asian countries have enacted
legislation restricting religious freedoms
in an attempt to curb the rise of radical
Islamic terrorism. The new laws have had
a damaging effect on the free practice
of religion. In 2004, the UN Special
Rapporteur on freedom of religion or
belief, Asma Jahangir, stated that freedom
of religion “is a fundamental right that

is not susceptible to derogation, even in
time of emergency.” Despite a legitimate
interest in promoting national security,
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan,
Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan also maintain a set of obligations to protect this basic
right as States Parties to the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR).
The threat of terrorism in Central Asia
is well-founded. In 1999 and 2004 a series
of bombings killed dozens in the Uzbek
capital Tashkent. Immediately after the
September 11 attacks in the United States,
Tajikistan initiated a ban on certain groups,
including Hizbut-Tahir, al-Qaeda, Bay-at,
the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, and
Harakati Tablighot. In 2006, Kyrgyzstan
labeled extremist group Hizbut-Tahrir
as the largest religious challenge in the
country. Kazakhstan has eliminated 42
extremist groups and prevented 35 terrorist
attacks since 2010 alone. However, many
of the new Religion Laws have broad
applications that affect religious activities
with no relation to terrorism.
Kyrgyzstan’s Administrative Code and
Turkmenistan’s Religious Organization
Law require any religious organization
operating within the state to register with
the government. Kyrgyzstan also bans
prayers and religious rituals not approved
by the state. Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and
Uzbekistan have made creating, promoting, and distributing religious materials
an offense subject to criminal penalties
or high fines. The Administrative Code
of Kyrgyzstan and the Criminal Code of
Tajikistan make it an offense to participate
in a religious organization that contradicts
the aims of the state. And Tajikistan’s new
Religion Law requires children to receive
all religious education from state-licensed
institutions. As previously reported in the
Human Rights Brief, the Tajik government
also enacted a Parental Responsibility Law
that requires parents to prevent children
from participating in religious activities
that are not sanctioned by the state.
The effects of these laws have been
present throughout Central Asia. According
to a Human Rights Watch report, hundreds
of religious organizations were forced to
close in 2012 after failing to receive official
registration from the Kazakh government.
In the Kostanai Region of Kazakhstan,
which has a population of 900,300, only
two bookshops are allowed to sell religious
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materials. The report also indicated that
during the same timeframe, over 200
people in Uzbekistan were arrested or
convicted for religious extremism. At the
beginning of the year, 1,823 Tajiks began
their studies in foreign religious institutions; 1,621 were required to return to
Tajikistan. The government of Kyrgyzstan
is currently holding 83 religious extremists in detention facilities, amid fears that
prisons have become breeding grounds for
terror recruitment.
Because every country in Central Asia
is a party to the ICCPR, each has an obligation to promote the freedom of thought,
conscience, and religion as outlined in
Article 18. The rights include the “freedom
to have or to adopt a religion or belief of
his choice, and freedom, either individually or in community with others and in
public or private, to manifest his religion
or belief in worship, observance, practice
and teaching.” The Central Asian countries claim they have not impinged upon
these rights because Article 18 also allows
for “such limitations as are prescribed
by law and are necessary to protect
public safety, order, health, or morals or
the fundamental rights and freedoms
of others.” The General Assembly has
affirmed that the Central Asian countries
have read this exception for national security too broadly. In Resolution 66/168, the
General Assembly expressed concern with
the growing number of restrictive laws and
intolerance motivated by Islamophobia.
The Special Rapporteur on the freedom of
religion or belief then affirmed that “states
should avoid equating certain religions
with terrorism as this may have adverse
consequences on the right to freedom
of religion or belief of all members of
the concerned religious communities
or communities of belief.” Despite the
sentiments by the General Assembly and
Special Rapporteur, the Central Asian laws
restricting the practice of religion have not
been amended or repealed.
While the Central Asian countries may
believe that the restrictions on religion
are justified in the face of rising threats
of terrorism, the ICCPR obliges member
states to respect religion as a fundamental
right. If the application of the Religion
Laws continues to create a substantial
burden on those not associated with terrorist activities, the United Nations, although
it has not articulated further steps, could
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begin to place more pressure on the Central
Asian governments.
Alyssa Antoniskis, a J.D. candidate
at the American University Washington
College of Law, is a staff writer for the
Human Rights Brief.

South Korean Law May Be
Infringing Upon the Right
to Freedom of Expression
on the Internet
South Korea, frequently considered
a regional leader in human rights and
democracy, and a State Party to the
International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR), has come under
recent UN scrutiny for its treatment of
freedom of expression on the Internet.
The ICCPR enumerates the universal
right to freedom of expression in Article
19, which protects the ability to “receive
and impart information and ideas of all
kinds” and limits this only with regard to
protection of the rights of other individuals, national security, public order, public
health, or morals. Similarly, the South
Korean Constitution provides the right to
freedom of speech, press, assembly, and
association, but it limits these protections
to the extent that they neither interfere
with “honor or rights of other persons
nor undermine public morals or social
ethics.” However, reports indicate that this
constitutional exception has been exploited
to regulate discourse on the Internet.
In 2007, in an effort to allay mounting
concerns over malicious and defamatory
posts online, the government of South
Korea instituted a real name identification
system, which forced websites with the
highest viewership to require all posters
of online content to use their real name
and risk prosecution. The South Korean
Constitutional Court (Court) overturned
the law in 2012.
Reports from watchdog groups defending media rights indicate that South
Koreans continue to face pressure on their
exercise of freedom of expression, even
after the Court struck down the real name
system. In 2008, after protests erupted
when the government ended a five-year
ban on U.S. beef imports, the government responded by passing much broader
legislation than the real name law: the
Comprehensive Measures for Information
Protection on the Internet. The law limits
defamation, obscenity, and broadly defined

threats to national security, and it forces
website operators to remove any content if
a third party claims it has been defamed,
with sanctions for operators who do not
immediately comply. The government also
established the Korea Communications
Standards Commission (KCSC) to help
pursue these ends; the organization is
empowered to monitor content on the
Web, issue recommendations to remove
defamatory content or content violative of
public morals that may lead to fines in the
case of noncompliance. Criticism of the
KCSC is often focused on its lack of transparency, broad-reaching powers, and the
lack of reviewability. Furthermore, censored
website operators or posters are generally not
given the opportunity to defend their content.
There are some indications that the measures are defended under the exceptions
for government regulation in the national
interest in both the Constitution and the
ICCPR, as South Korea seeks to ensure
public morality and social ethics.
The exceptions for national interest
may not be broad enough to encompass
South Korea’s regulation of expression. In
the Constitutional Court opinion that overturned the real name identification system,
the Court held that the law violated the
South Korean Constitution, specifically
with regard to citizens’ freedom of expression. The Court ruled that such restrictions
are unjustifiable unless supported by clear
public interests, applying constitutional
principles that echo obligations under the
ICCPR. The UN Human Rights Council
(UNHRC) clarified the ICCPR’s freedom of expression provisions in General
Comment 10, which provided that the
protection is not limited in regard to specific media—all media is protected. The
UNHRC recently reaffirmed the importance of free expression on the Internet,
citing it as a force for development and
an integral, protected component of the
already enumerated freedom of expression. The UNHRC further emphasized that
all rights that are protected offline should
be protected online.
Though the Constitutional Court struck
down the real name identification law,
reports indicate that South Korea may
no longer be the beacon of free press in
Asia that it was once considered. The
Comprehensive Measures for Information
Protection on the Internet law, coupled
with the KCSC, continue to burden free
expression. The UN Special Rapporteur
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for Freedom of Expression, Frank La Rue,
warned last year that defamation suits
are being used to censor expression that
informs the public interest. La Rue pointed
out the structural burden on freedom of
expression caused by these laws. To maintain its reputation for protecting human
rights, South Korea could go far by heeding the advice of La Rue and demonstrating commitment to freedom of expression
on the Internet.

Mongolia Seeks to Capitalize
on Potential for Poverty
Reduction Through its Human
Development Fund
When Mongolia transitioned from a
centrally planned economy to a free market
economy in the early 1990s, many of
the country’s poorest were left without
access to essential services, but the state
is making a renewed effort to alleviate
that disparity. As the state adapted to its
new economic structure, the discovery
of extensive mineral resources facilitated
privatization and growth, and though much
of the population benefited, many did not.
Estimates place the value of Mongolia’s
untapped resources as high as one trillion
U.S. dollars, and the per capita gross
domestic product tripled from 2004 to
2010, but concern remains over whether
these resources will benefit the poor, who
make up roughly 35 percent of the overall
population. Furthermore, watchdog groups
like Freedom House have brought attention
to corruption and lack of transparency
in the awarding of lucrative mineralextraction contracts to foreign enterprises,
which often limits the domestic impact of
national resource wealth. To allay these
fears, Mongolia’s parliament passed laws
in 2008 aimed at wealth distribution. These
laws, the National Development Strategy
and the Human Development Fund
(HDF), purported to make citizens eligible
for access to the nation’s vast mineral
wealth. The planned scope of HDF was
immense; it was hoped that the fund would
provide financial resources to pay for
social services including pensions, health
care, housing, and education, as well as
provide cash payouts to citizens. Though
data to quantify the early impact of the
HDF is not yet readily available, distribution of funds recently became entangled in
Mongolia’s electoral politicking.
Despite concerns over the implementation of the HDF, the program has potential
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to have tremendous impact on Mongolia’s
efforts to comply with its obligations under
the International Covenant on Economic,
Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR),
to which Mongolia is a State Party. The
program would align the state’s goals with
objectives of the ICESCR insofar as the
HDF would expand citizens’ access to
national wealth and facilitate the protection of several ICESCR enumerated rights.
The ICESCR obliges States Parties to
recognize the rights to work (Article
6), social security (Article 9), adequate
standards of living and freedom from
hunger (Article 11), and the highest attainable standards of health and accessible
healthcare (Article 12).
Mongolia’s efforts to achieve the
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)
reflect the national need to address issues
of poverty and poor health and education
standards. The MDGs specifically focus
on eradication of poverty and hunger,
universalization of primary education,
gender equality and participation, and
several health-care-based initiatives. The
report on implementation of the MDGs in
Mongolia indicates a need to focus social
services for the poorest and the historically
marginalized. This imperative is echoed by
Magdalena Sepúlveda Carmona, the UN
Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and
human rights, who asserted: “Mongolia
has established a robust legal framework,
recognizing that everyone must enjoy the
rights to education, health, housing, food,
etc. However, the laws do not necessarily
translate into the everyday reality for many
Mongolians.”
The government has plans to go beyond
the HDF: draft versions of The Package
Law on Social Welfare and The Mongolian
Law on Employment Promotion were
recently submitted to the country’s parliament. Each of the laws targets the most
vulnerable groups and the poorest in
an effort to extend the availability of
social security programs and increase job
creation. General Comment No. 18 to
ICESCR, issued by the Committee on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
explains that the right to work under
Article 6 encompasses state programs
supporting the availability of employment,
the accessibility of the labor market to all,
and the acceptability and quality of that
employment.

It is unclear whether Mongolia’s
efforts will be effective to meet national
goals that align with the ICESCR and the
MDGs. The government’s comprehensive
attack on poverty is still young, but the
apparent intent to distribute wealth and
ensure the provision of social programming could go far in aiding Mongolia’s
poor. Haruhiko Kuroda, the President of
the Asian Development Bank pointed to
the proper management of the country’s
mineral resources as integral to the country’s successful development, hinging this
success on good governance and a policy
of economic inclusion that trickles down
to the poorest and sees benefits broadly
distributed. Though Mongolia’s poverty
rate continues to be high, commenters
seem optimistic that, properly managed,
Mongolia’s mineral wealth has the ability
to elevate the country’s most need-stricken.
Gabriel Auteri, a J.D. candidate at the
American University Washington College
of Law, is a staff writer for the Human
Rights Brief.

Anti-Acid Violence Legislation
in Pakistan not Mitigating
Growing Occurrence of Acid
Attacks on Women
Although recent legislation aims to
reduce acid violence in Pakistan, acid
attacks are on the rise. Acid violence—the
throwing of corrosive acid on a person’s
face or body—is an intentional act used as
a form of violence against women, often
in Pakistan, but it is also prevalent in other
South Asian countries. The acid causes
extreme damage to flesh and can even
reach and harm the bone, permanently
disfiguring victims of the attacks or even
killing them. Since many cases of acid
attacks go unreported, a true estimate
of such attacks is difficult to determine.
However, Pakistani non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) estimate the number
to be 150-200 cases per year. In many situations, husbands, in-laws, or other family
members throw acid on the (generally)
female victim for revenge or because of a
perceived wrongdoing on her part. Other
reasons for targeting a woman are her
refusal of a marriage proposal, rejection
of a sexual advance, or for a dispute
involving dowry or property. Acid attacks
are an inexpensive method of violence,
since bottles of corrosive acid are widely
available for about twenty rupees, or less
than fifty U.S. cents. Despite the passage
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of Pakistan’s Acid Control and Acid Crime
Prevention Act, which brings the country
in line with its international obligations to
curb violence toward women, the Act has
not produced desired conviction rates.
No explicit mention of acid attacks has
been made in international law, but the
United Nations (UN) Declaration on the
Elimination of Violence Against Women
(Declaration) and the UN Convention on the
Elimination of all forms of Discrimination
Against Women (CEDAW), apply to
acid attack cases and domestic violence.
In a 2003 Resolution, the UN General
Assembly further reaffirmed “the call for
the elimination of violence against women
and girls, especially all forms of . . . crimes
committed in the name of passion . . .
dowry-related violence and deaths, [and]
acid attacks.”
The Declaration states that it serves to
complement CEDAW, which, if effectively
implemented could “contribute to the
elimination of violence against women.”
Article 1 of the Declaration defines violence
against women as “any act of gender-based
violence that results in, or is likely to
result in physical, sexual, or psychological
harm or suffering to women.” Acid attacks
fall under the category of gender-based
violence because of the physical and
psychological suffering women endure.
Pakistan acceded to CEDAW in 1996
and Article 5 of the Convention calls for
States Parties to “take all appropriate measures” to “modify the social and cultural
patterns of conduct of men and women,
with a view of achieving the elimination
of prejudices . . . [and] practices which
are based on the idea of inferiority or the
superiority of either of the sexes . . . .”
Since acid violence perpetuates the idea of
inferiority of women, Pakistan is obligated
to take measures to counter such violence
from continuing.
Pakistan did enact the Acid Control
and Acid Crime Prevention Act in 2011
that made significant changes to the country’s Penal Code, explicitly outlawing acid
attacks and punishing perpetrators of acid
violence. The Act expanded the definition
to include “disfigures or defaces” in the
original definition of “Whoever causes
pain, harm, disease, infianity or injury to
any person or impairs, disables, [disfigures, or defaces] or dismembers any organ
of the body or part thereof of any person
without causing his death, is said to cause
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hurt.” The Act adds two new sections into
the Penal Code for Voluntarily causing hurt
by dangerous means or substances, which
states, “[W]hoever voluntarily causes hurt
by means of . . . corrosive substance or
acid…shall be called to have caused hurt
by dangerous means or substances.” The
other new section for the Punishment for
causing hurt by dangerous means or substances punishes whomever intends to hurt
or likely hurt any person “by dangerous
means or substances . . . with imprisonment for a term which may extend to the
whole of life, or with fine which may not
be less than five hundred thousand rupees,
or with both.” The Act also calls for the
accused to pay for the loss of earning and
medical expense of the victim and tackles
the procurement of acid, only allowing
licensed individuals to manufacture and
sell acid.
Despite this law, an annual report
published by the Aurat Foundation reported
a 37.5% increase in acid attacks since
2011, suggesting the ineffectiveness of
this new act. One reason for the continued
acid violence is the “very low conviction”
rate because of “discriminatory societal
attitudes.” Pakistan is obligated under
CEDAW to eliminate these cultural notions
that preserve violence toward women. The
Progressive Women’s Association investigated only 600 cases out of the 9,000
reports of acid violence from 1994 to
2011. Of those 600 cases, only two percent
of perpetrators were convicted. A low
conviction rate suggests that the majority
of acid attackers have been immune from
punishment and have not yet been deterred
from continuing acid violence.

Sri Lankan Officials have
Dismissed Allegations of
Torture on LTTE Detainees
Four years after the end of Sri Lanka’s
civil war, suspected members and supporters of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil
Eelam (LTTE)—the force opposing the
Sri Lankan government during the armed
conflict—are reportedly still subjected to
various forms of torture, including physical and sexual violence, at the hands of
government agents. Sri Lankan security
forces continue to face allegations that
they torture detainees in detention centers,
prisons, police stations, or in unofficial
facilities in order to coerce the LTTE members and supporters into confessing to their
participation. Torture is prohibited by the

Sri Lankan Constitution as well as international instruments to which Sri Lanka has
acceded, such as the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and
the Convention against Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment (CAT). Sri Lankan officials
have so far dismissed the torture claims,
thus preventing a serious investigation into
these allegations.
The LTTE, a Tamil militant group,
emerged in the 1980s in response to what
they perceived as growing discrimination
against the minority Tamil population in
Sri Lanka. Desiring to separate from Sri
Lanka, the Tamil militants often forcibly
recruited members from the Tamil minority
population to join in the efforts as soldiers
or supporters. The Sri Lankan government
defeated the LTTE in May 2009, but the
war resulted in a high civilian death toll
and detention for the LTTE members who
were captured at the end.
Two reports, one from the NGO
Freedom from Torture and another from
Human Rights Watch, documented incidents of torture against LTTE detainees.
Many of these suspected LTTE members
and supporters were arrested after the
end of the war under authority granted
by the country’s Prevention of Terrorism
Act. Under Section 6 of the Act, senior
police officers would have the authority
to arrest, without a warrant, any individuals they reasonably suspected of offenses
such as murder, kidnapping, robbery of
public property, and firearm possession
in security areas, among others. Since the
law does not define reasonable suspicion,
there is potential danger of arbitrary arrest
of individuals. Many of those detained are
placed in detention for up to six months
without “effective due process”—the right
to a fair trial and legal representation.
Once in this custody, Human Rights
Watch reported that detainees are frequently
victims of sexual violence, including the
rape of both men and women, sexual
assault, forced nudity, and sexual humiliation. According to the report, the situation
is more dire because the Prevention of
Terrorism Act provides such deference to
security forces that they are “effectively
[immune]” from punishment for inflicting
torture.
Echoing the language of Article 7 of
the ICCPR—to which Sri Lanka acceded
in 1980—Article 11 of the Sri Lankan
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Constitution calls for freedom from torture
for all persons. Sexual violence and physical abuse reportedly committed by the
Sri Lankan security forces toward LTTE
detainees would constitute torture under
Article 1 of the CAT—to which Sri Lanka
acceded in 1994—which prohibits “any
act by which severe pain or suffering,
whether physical or mental, is intentionally
inflicted on a person for such purposes as
obtaining … a confession.”
The torture reportedly inflicted on
LTTE detainees also implicates domestic
protections. Article 11 of the Sri Lankan
Constitution forbids the use of torture or
“cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment”
on any person. In a Sri Lankan Supreme
Court case, Fernando v. Chrishantha,
where the plaintiff was found to be tortured
in a Sri Lankan prison, the court held that
the prisoner’s “standing in the society” is
not a consideration in determining whether
his right to be free from torture under
Article 11 of the Constitution was violated.
However, Sri Lankan High Commissioner
to New Delhi Prasad Kariyawasam, speaking on behalf of the Sri Lankan government,
did not accept the allegations of torture
from Human Rights Watch as true, and
said that there is a lack of evidence to
substantiate said allegations. He stated
that these allegations are most likely “sob
stories for the sake of obtaining asylum
or refugee status in a developed country.”
This refusal to accept the validity of the
allegations has prevented proper investigation into the detainees’ claims of torture.
Without impartial investigation into these
allegations, the detainees’ confessions are
of questionable validity since it cannot be
determined whether the evidence of their
terrorist affiliation was forced by means
of torture.
Anusree Garg, a J.D. candidate at the
American University Washington College
of Law, is a staff writer for the Human
Rights Brief.

Central Asian States Disregard
LGBT Rights
Throughout Central Asia, lesbian, gay,
bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) people
must hide their sexual orientation for fear
of violence, extortion by the authorities,
and even arrest. The lack of protections
for this population creates a human rights
issue. In the Soviet era, homosexuality
was criminalized and could lead to several
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years in prison. Since the dissolution of
the Soviet Union in 1991, the situation
for LGBT people in Central Asia remains
precarious, with homosexuality still criminalized in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan
and discrimination and marginalization
throughout the region. The Central Asian
countries can come into line with international law, enshrined in the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR) and the International Covenant
on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights
(ICESCR) and emerging norms by decriminalizing homosexuality and combatting
social norms stigmatizing people based on
their sexual orientation.
Article 9 of the ICCPR defends against
arbitrary arrest and protects everyone’s
rights to liberty and security of person
while Article 17 protects people from
unlawful interference with privacy. Article
26 of the ICCPR and Article 2 of the
ICESCR both guarantee protection against
discrimination on any grounds. In 2012,
the UN Office of the High Commissioner
for Human Rights (OHCHR) explained
that although the non-discrimination
guarantees listed in the ICCPR and the
ICESCR do not explicitly include “sexual
orientation,” they all include the words
“other status.” The OHCHR explained that
the inclusion of the words “other status”
affirms that the lists of discriminations
were intentionally left open to include
future grounds for discrimination, such as
sexual orientation, which were not considered when the documents were written.
In 2009, the Committee on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR)
confirmed that the non-discrimination
guarantee of the ICESCR includes sexual
orientation. The CESCR explained that
states should ensure that a person’s sexual
orientation is not a barrier to realizing
ICESCR rights. In June 2011, the Human
Rights Council adopted the first UN resolution on sexual orientation and gender
identity, expressing “grave concern” at
violence and discrimination against individuals based on their sexual orientation
and gender identity, leading to the first UN
report on this issue.
Discrimination against LGBT people
is the prevailing standard throughout
the Central Asian states. Article 120 of
Uzbekistan’s criminal code outlaws sexual
intercourse between two men, as does
Article 135 of Turkmenistan’s criminal code.

Since 1998, homosexuality is no longer
outlawed in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and
Tajikistan. Despite this legal change, the
lack of specific protections for LGBT
people and an environment where LGBT
individuals cannot approach authorities
for fear of blackmail or violence has led
to societal discrimination, which functions as if it is institutionalized by law. In
Kyrgyzstan, lesbian and bisexual women
are often subjected to forced marriages
and rape in an effort to “cure” them.
Homophobia is widespread in Tajikistan,
where many view homosexuality as a sin
or a disease and the general population
is intolerant of homosexuality because
of traditional attitudes and Islam’s
strong influence on the population. This
discrimination implicates the rights to
privacy and expression because LGBT
people are forced to hide their identities for
fear of government and societal reprisal.

See

According to the organization Civil
Rights Defenders, “[T]here are no legal
safeguards against discrimination based
on sexual orientation or gender identity
in any of the Central Asian countries.”
The organization also claims that human
rights organizations in the region have
been unwilling to defend LGBT rights
and that if LGBT issues are addressed, it
is usually in a manner that creates further
stigmatization, such as in conjunction with
HIV prevention initiatives. These initiatives, in and of themselves often carry their
own cultural stigma, further marginalizing
LGBT issues. In 2009, an Uzbek HIV
rights activist was sentenced to seven years
in prison for seducing minors; the court
used the activist’s safe sex campaign as
evidence that his activities contradicted
the national traditions and culture of
Uzbekistan. In Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
and Tajikistan, however, there are initiatives and organizations working openly
for LGBT rights and HIV prevention. As a
marginalized population, LGBT people in
Central Asia need government protections
to ensure that they enjoy the rights offered
to all persons under international law.
By arbitrarily arresting, blackmailing,
criminalizing, physically and verbally
abusing, and engaging in general discrimination against LGBT people, the Central
Asian countries are not upholding the
ICCPR and the ICESCR. These documents
are both binding on the Central Asian
countries because Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan,
Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan are all
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States Parties. The only way for the Central
Asian states to come into line with the
ICCPR and the ICESCR is to decriminalize homosexuality and to establish laws
protecting their LGBT communities from
discrimination. Even where homosexuality
is decriminalized, societal discrimination
and marginalization deprive LGBT people
of their basic rights, which are guaranteed
by the ICCPR and ICESCR.
Emily Singer Hurvitz, a J.D. candidate
at the American University Washington
College of Law, is a staff writer for the
Human Rights Brief.

Europe
Italy’s Return of Asylum
kers to Greece Raises
Human Rights Concerns
The Italian government has recently
instituted a policy of returning asylumseekers back to abusive conditions in
Greece without reviewing their claims,
an approach in conflict with both national
and international obligations. Italy has
continued to pursue this policy of summary return of both Greek asylum-seekers
and persons from northern Africa who
originally were seeking asylum in Greece
despite requests from observers, including Council of Europe Commissioner
for Human Rights Nils Muižnieks and
the UN Special Rapporteur on rights of
migrants François Crépeau, that the state
discontinue the practice. As immigration
law is currently enforced, both adults and
children are generally deported via commercial ferries and confined in makeshift
holding cells or engine rooms under the
custody of the ship’s captain. According to
media reports, asylum-seekers are sometimes denied adequate food and, upon
return, Greece has been unable to provide
the individuals with basic requirements of
safety and shelter. This maltreatment is
attributable to Greece’s overburdened asylum system—a system which leaves little
chance that asylum-seekers will receive
adequate support within Greece and has
led to numerous reports of human rights
violations perpetrated by Greek authorities.
The Dublin Regulation (Dublin II), to
which both nations are bound, governs
the interaction between Italy and Greece
regarding which state should process
claims by asylum-seekers. The European
Union (EU) regulation requires that
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asylum claims be dealt with by the first
Member State in which the asylum-seeker
arrives. Should the individual leave that
first state, the individual can be returned to
the state of entry in the EU. The assumption under Dublin II is that EU Member
States will comply with their international
obligations toward asylum-seekers under
the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967
Protocol, the European Convention on
Human Rights (ECHR), the Qualification
Directive, and the EU Charter. The stated
goal of Dublin II is to ensure that one
Member State is responsible for the examination of individual asylum claims in
a manner that respects the fundamental
rights of asylum-seekers. Additionally, it
is meant to promote judicial efficiency of
the asylum process and to deter individuals
from filing multiple asylum claims. In
practice, however, refugee rights advocates note that Dublin II often acts as a
roadblock to refugees by causing extensive
delays in the examination of asylum claims
by sending asylum-seekers back to their
point of entry and increasing pressure on
EU border countries that receive a disproportionate number of asylum-seekers
compared to northern European countries.
The use of Dublin II in relation to
the Greece and Italy situation has drawn
concern. In December 2009, the UN High
Commissioner for Refugees recommended
that governments stop sending asylumseekers back to Greece and stop applying
Dublin II provisions until further notice,
a request with which many nations complied. In 2011, the European Court of
Human Rights in M.S.S. v. Belgium &
Greece held that Belgium had violated
Articles 3 and 13 of the ECHR by sending asylum-seekers back to Greece under
Dublin II. Also in 2011, the EU Court
of Justice held in NS v. ME that Member
States have an obligation not to transfer
asylum seekers to Member States where
they would face inhuman or degrading
treatment in violation of Article 4 of the
EU Charter.
By returning asylum seekers to Greece
without fully examining individual asylum
requests, Italy has failed to address the
concerns raised by the courts and intergovernmental organizations. Further economic
issues, especially in Greece but throughout
Europe, continue to impede states’ abilities
to provide integration services for migrants
in the continent. Although movement has
been made to standardize EU practices

through implementation of a Common
European Asylum System, as the states
negotiate the asylum-seekers continue to
face hardships.
Such hardships are not made easier
by the economic hardship faced by the
southern European countries that is exacerbated by their proximity to northern
Africa, currently the source of a high
number of asylum-seekers. Many such
individuals enter via undocumented transportation, making it exceedingly difficult
to regulate the numbers of people entering
the European countries. Without assistance from northern European countries,
it is difficult for the migrant-receiving
countries in the south to process asylum claims under Dublin II. In 2011, the
Italian Minister of the Interior appealed
explicitly for this kind of additional support from fellow European states. Italy
may be violating its responsibilities under
Dublin II and various human rights documents, but without support from other
European states, Italy’s economic burdens
make it difficult for them to meet these
obligations. Nevertheless, continent-wide
cooperation could create a viable path to
adequately process asylum requests under
Dublin II that respects the individuals
seeking protection.

Belgium Mulls Allowing
Children to Choose Death
Belgium is currently considering
expanding a 2002 euthanasia law so that
chronically ill children would be granted
the right to choose to die. This proposed
legislation has raised concerns from many
groups about its implications on the quality of care available to children and the
potential exploitation of chronically ill
children for their organs. Current legislation allows adults over age eighteen to
exercise the right to choose to die. The
practice has been on the rise in Belgium;
between 2011 and 2012, there was a 25
percent increase in reported physicianassisted deaths, accounting for two percent of the total deaths in the country.
Some doctors administering euthanasia
procedures said they feel that part of caring
for their patients is providing conditions in
which a person can die with dignity. Before
adults can access the right to die through
euthanasia, they must show that they are suffering from a “hopeless medical situation,”
though this standard includes non-terminal
conditions. Potentially extending the right
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to die to children has led critics to express
a renewed sense of concern about the
implications of such legislation.
Religious and anti-euthanasia advocacy
groups point to a number of informed consent issues arising out of the practice of child
euthanasia. One particular area of concerns
is the use of organ donation in cases where
children, whose organs are in high demand,
did not consent. More generally, a 2010
report in the Canadian Medical Association
Journal (CMAJ) revealed that nearly half of
the interviewed Belgian nurses, who are not
legally permitted to administer euthanasia
drugs, admitted to participating in physicianassisted deaths. Another study published in
CMAJ found that nurses perform 32 percent
of assisted deaths without an explicit request
or consent, and 1.8 percent of cases classified as assisted death occurred without the
consent of the patient. It also found that
nearly half of physician-assisted suicides in
the Flanders region were unreported, which
hinders oversight.
Consistent with the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights, states codified and
extended the rights of life, liberty, and security of persons to children in Article 3 of
the Convention on the Rights of the Child
(CRC), to which Belgium is a party. This
article mandates that the “best interest of the
child” should be the guiding principle for all
matters concerning children. Additionally,
Belgium faces certain obligations surrounding a child’s right to express her desires in
relation to medical treatment. Article 12 of
the CRC states that children must be allowed
to express their views freely in accordance
with their age and maturity. The article’s
meaning is explained in the Committee on
the Rights of the Child’s General Comment
No. 12, which states that children must
be allowed to express their views on their
individual healthcare decisions. However, the
Committee recognized that the child’s right
to be heard must recognize the role a child’s
maturity plays.
In the United Kingdom, a fourteenyear-old girl stated that she did not want
to continue with her life-saving cancer
treatments, but later changed her mind
and decided to undergo chemotherapy
after receiving a text message from a
friend. These apparently impulsive decisions are what critics of the law wish
to avoid. Conversely, many people argue
that children with serious and incurable
diseases should have the same rights as
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adults to choose the appropriate form
of treatment. Studies have shown that
children often display greater lucidity than
adults on the issue of death and often have
skill, understanding, and maturity to make
decisions about their personal medical
situation. Parents of an eighteen-year-old
who chose to exercise her right to die in
the Netherlands said that their daughter’s
decision allowed her to retain some dignity
as her quality of life declined. Belgium
faces the difficult task of balancing its
obligations under the CRC to ensure that
children’s voices are heard with its mandate to protect the child’s best interest.
Belgium is not the only country pursuing this type of legislation. A proposed law
in the Netherlands would similarly expand
euthanasia to children. As a child’s right
to choose to die gains legislative ground,
protection from potential abuses of euthanasia will become particularly relevant for
suffering children, one of the continent’s
most fragile groups. Because children are
not always able to speak for themselves,
the CRC requires that children’s rights be
viewed through a different framework than
that used for comparable rights afforded
to adults. Consequently, simply expanding
the current Belgian legislation to children
may not take into account the complexities and vulnerabilities of youth. With
the proper safeguards in place, Belgium
may be able to successfully implement its
proposed legislation and provide children
with appropriate autonomy in decisions
involving the right to choose to die.
Christa Elliott, a J.D. candidate at the
American University Washington College
of Law, is a staff writer for the Human
Rights Brief.

Middle East and North Africa
State Sovereignty or
emocracy: Which Will
Win in Iran’s election?
D

After widespread protests following
the disputed 2009 election results, the
ruling elite led by Ayatollah Ali Khamenei
have chosen to ensure a consolidation of
power before the June 2013 election. In
August 2012, the UN Secretary-General
expressed deep concern about “reports
of the increasing number of . . . arbitrary
arrest and detention, unfair trials, torture
and ill treatment; and the severe restrictions targeting media professionals, human

rights defenders, lawyers and opposition
activists.” Since the release of the SecretaryGeneral’s report, the arbitrary arrests have
increased, creating an urgent need for Iran
to comply with its binding obligations under
the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR).
The ICCPR grants all peoples the ability
to freely determine their political status,
the right to hold opinions without interference, and the right to self-determination.
In February, UN Special Rapporteur on the
rights and freedom of peaceful assembly
and of association, Maina Kiai, publically reminded Iran of its obligations to
protect civil liberties. In early 2012, Iran’s
Guardian Council disqualified more than
2,000 potential candidates for the parliamentary election, citing a lack of adherence to
Islam and the Constitution. No opposition
parties or candidates have been allowed to
propose alternative presidential candidates.
Iran also appears to be increasing its media
censorship by criminalizing any action that
purports to organize a protest, expresses a
“disturbing political opinion,” or insults
the presidential candidates. In January
2011, the Iranian government created the
Iranian Cyber Police (FATA) to secure
the country from cyber crimes. In recent
months, FATA has been monitoring online
bloggers, activists, and citizen groups that
are critical of President Ahmadinejad.
Many fear that as the election nears, FATA
may attempt to block campaign blogs and
social networking sites that rally support for opposition leaders, repeating the
government blockade of websites in 2009.
These actions would stand in direct conflict
with Iran’s obligations under Article 19 of
the ICCPR, which provides that “everyone
shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to
seek, receive and impart information and
ideas of all kinds.”
The ICCPR also obligates States
Parties, including Iran, which ratified
the Covenant in 1975, to protect against
arbitrary arrests and ensure fair trials. In
2011, former presidential candidates Mir
Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi,
and Mousavi’s wife, Zahra Rahnavard,
were placed under house arrest and banned
from participating in parliamentary elections. The Iranian government condemned
these opposition leaders for inciting the
2009 riots. Because formal charges were
never filed, the United Nations Working
Group on Arbitrary Detention condemned
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the arrests in 2012. In February 2013, the
UN Special Rapporteur on Iran, Ahmed
Shaheed, called for the immediate release
of hundreds of Iranian political prisoners,
including Mousavi and Karroubi, who
remain under house arrest.
Shaheed’s requests came on the heels of
a wave of arbitrary arrests and harassment
of political activists, human rights lawyers, and media workers. A report by the
Committee to Protect Journalists indicated
that Iran is a close second for having the
highest number of journalists imprisoned.
In January, security forces arrested sixteen
journalists in a single week. A recent Human
Rights Watch Report documents the mass
exodus of Iranian lawyers and activists to
neighboring Iraq and Turkey. The report
indicates that the UN High Commissioner
for Refugees received 11,537 asylum
applications in 2009; 15,185 in 2010; and
18,128 in 2011. In response to Shaheed’s
call for the end of arbitrary imprisonment,
the Iranian government labeled the scrutiny
of Iran by the UN Special Rapporteurs as
an attempt at political sabotage. As one
of only a handful of countries with a UN
Special Rapporteur assigned to it, Iran feels
that it has been unjustly singled out. Yet, the
Iranian government has repeatedly ignored
its obligations under the ICCPR to ensure
that “no one shall be subjected to arbitrary
arrest or detention.” As the election nears,
the international community will be analyzing Iran’s compliance with its ICCPR
obligations. Specifically, it will scrutinize
Iran’s commitment to ensure a free election
by universal suffrage, “held by secret ballot,
guaranteeing the free expression of the will
of the electors.”
Since this analysis was written in April
2013, the Iranian elections took place with
relatively few security incidents and the
victory of a moderate candidate, Hassan
Rouhani. The ruling clerics, under Ayatollah
Khamenei's leadership, sucessfully adverted
a repeat of the 2009 widespread protests by
continuing the house arrest of reformist
leaders, intimidation activists, and stifling
journalists. Iran's obligation to uphold the
rule of law and protect basic freedoms
continues far beyond the comparatively quit
election period.
Alyssa Antoniskis, a J.D. candidate
at the American University Washington
College of Law, is a staff writer for the
Human Rights Brief.
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The Plight of Syrian Refugees in
Lebanon
Almost one million Syrian citizens
have fled their country since peaceful
protests, beginning in March 2011, transformed into a violent civil war. Fighting
between Bashar al-Assad’s regime and
opposition militias has ravaged cities and
towns throughout Syria. Lebanon, which
has an official policy of dissociation with
the Syrian conflict to prevent hostilities
from spilling over the border, is absorbing
a large portion of the Syrian refugees
who are fleeing the war-torn country. As
of May 2013, the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
estimates that the number of Syrian
refugees in Lebanon exceeds 430,000.
The country of four million, however,
is not legally obligated to care for the
refugees because it is not a party to the
1951 Convention Relating to the Status
of Refugees (Refugee Convention). Due
to the large influx of refugees into the
tiny country, Lebanon is faced with a
predicament seen in many conflicts that
international law provides an insufficient
framework for solving.
According to the Statute of the Office
of the UNHCR, which was adopted by
the UN General Assembly, all governments should cooperate with the High
Commissioner in the performance of
his functions. Article 23 of the Refugee
Convention promises refugees the same
treatment, with respect to public relief and
assistance, as is accorded to a country’s
own citizens. Article 14 of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR)
enshrines the right of persons to enjoy
asylum from persecution in other countries. However, this framework may not be
enough to safeguard the rights of Syrian
refugees in Lebanon.
Syrian refugees in Lebanon that have
yet to register with the UNHCR cannot
receive necessities such as food, blankets, and rental assistance. In a February
interview with National Public Radio, the
UNHCR representative in Lebanon said
that the agency simply cannot keep up with
the growing number of refugees—4,200
people per day currently approaching the
agency, as compared to 1,700 people per
day in December 2012. Aid workers have
indicated that the registration process is
hindering refugees from receiving necessary aid in a timely manner.

Lebanon absorbed over 400,000
Palestinian refugees since 1948, many of
whom are still living in refugee camps run
by the United Nations Relief and Works
Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near
East (UNRWA). Because of this history,
Lebanon has forbidden the construction of
formal refugee camps for Syrian refugees.
The UNHCR says that Lebanon does not
have the legal or administrative procedures
in place to address the specific needs of
refugees, leaving them vulnerable to arrest,
detention, and deportation. The agency
notes that improving protections for refugees in Lebanon is a priority and that it is
working toward a more stable understanding with the Lebanese government.
Lebanon’s fragile political balance
and its history with Palestinian refugees
certainly provide reason for caution, but
these are not an excuse to escape the steps
that need to be taken. According to the
UNHCR Syria Regional Response Plan,
refugees are scattered across Lebanon in
over 540 locations, in some of the poorest
areas of the country, because Lebanon has
not established refugee camps. Without
centralized locations for refugees to live,
they are forced to find shelter throughout
Lebanese communities, making aid more
difficult to distribute.
The UNHCR emphasizes that burdensharing is key to maintaining the protection
of refugees. In furtherance of this theory,
the UNHCR assists refugees so that the
cost of their welcome is not borne by
the countries of refuge alone. Turkey and
Egypt are the only countries, of the five
formally accepting Syrian refugees, that
are bound by the Refugee Convention.
They are better equipped to deal with the
refugee situation because they are bound
by international law to provide additional
protections. If Lebanon were a party to
the Convention, the refugees would be
afforded automatic protections, such as the
right to receive identification documents
and the right not to be deported back to
Syria.
The UNHCR Statute, the Refugee
Convention, and the UDHR all highlight
the rights that should be afforded to
Syrian refugees in Lebanon. Improving
the situation for these refugees falls on the
UNHCR, the Lebanese government, and
other developed countries to provide sufficient aid. Without binding international
guidance, Syrian refugees depend on the
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good will of the international community
for survival. The UNHCR can be better
prepared to deal with the influx of refugees
in Lebanon by making the registration
process more efficient and reinforcing
the staff and resources available for registering refugees. Since the key players
dealing with this refugee situation lack
necessary resources and there is an insufficient binding legal structure, it remains
an insurmountable challenge to provide the
Syrian refugees with their UDHR rights to
asylum and for them to be treated equal to
Lebanon’s own citizens.
Emily Singer Hurvitz, a J.D. candidate
at the American University Washington
College of Law, is a staff writer for the
Human Rights Brief.

Sub-Saharan Africa
Suppression of Civil Society
Raises Concern over Zimbabwe’s
Constitutional Referendum
Zimbabwe’s constitutional referendum
may signal a new future for Zimbabwean
governance and human rights, but arrests
and raids of several human rights organizations have cast doubt on the legitimacy of
the process. The constitutional referendum
was passed with 94.5 percent of the vote,
and political elections are scheduled for
the summer. The motivation for the reform
traces back to the country’s 2008 elections and the power-sharing agreement
between the political parties of President
Robert Mugabe and Prime Minister
Morgan Tsvangirai. Observers questioned
the validity of the elections, which were
colored by allegations of vote suppression
and fraud. Tsvangirai’s party narrowly won
a majority in parliament, and his assertion
that Mugabe could not remain president
without a majority in parliament led to
an extensive power-sharing agreement
under which Mugabe became president
and Tsvangirai became Prime Minister.
Events leading up to the referendum
vote, however, indicated a suppression
of the involvement of the Zimbabwean
people, instead of the empowerment that
the power-sharing agreement purports to
reinforce.
Article VI of the power-sharing agreement
established the constitutional referendum
and acknowledged the “fundamental right
and duty of the Zimbabwean people to
make a constitution by themselves and for
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themselves.” In referencing the referendum
before the UN General Assembly in 2009,
Mugabe expressed his “unwavering commitment to chart a new vision for the
country and to improve the lives of the
people in peace and harmony.”
However, the government engaged
in arrests of members of civil society
throughout the reform process and such
efforts increased in the months leading up
to the vote. In August 2012, Zimbabwean
riot police described by witnesses as
“visibly drunk” raided the headquarters of
the Gay and Lesbian Alliance of Zimbabwe
(GALZ). Employees stated that they were
assaulted as the officers seized documents
based on charges of running an “unregistered organization,” an allegation also used
to authorize the arrest of the director of the
Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum.
Authorities have also apprehended several
members of the Counseling Service Unit
(CSU), a torture and political violence
support organization, for possession of
“offensive and subversive material.”
The weeks leading up to the vote have
been particularly intense for what activists
call suppression of civil society. Police
officers on February 11 twice raided the
offices of the Zimbabwean Police Project,
which has been a target of antagonism dating back to the arrest and alleged torture
of its director in 2008. On the recent
occasion, officers entered the offices both
times brandishing warrants for “subversive
material.” On February 13, when the date
for the referendum was announced, eight
members of Women of Zimbabwe Arise
(WOZA) were arrested following what
reports have described as police beatings
and tear gas deployment against activists
handing out roses and teddy bears during a
Valentine’s Day demonstration outside the
Zimbabwean Parliament.
Civil society organizations’ activities
related to voting in the referendum have
also led to raids on several organizations
and arrests on charges of voter registration
fraud. ZimRights, a human rights organization, has seen its director and secretary,
among other employees, arrested for “voter
registration fraud.” Officials charged the
employees with “publishing falsehoods,
fraud and forgery after . . . conducting illegal voter registration.” Similarly, following
an initial arrest of forty members, officials
charged two leaders of the National Youth
Development Trust with voter registration

fraud for possessing voter registration
receipts. This has also extended to the
arrest of two officials from the Zimbabwe
Electoral Support Network for holding an
“unsanctioned public meeting.”
Targeting civil society with violence
and arrest based on political activity are
violations not only of the professed purpose
of the constitutional referendum, but also
with the inclusion of state authorities in the
reported situations, the actions implicate
Zimbabwe’s obligations under international
human rights law. The charges and the
circumstances of the arrests are indicative
of arbitrary arrest due to their broad nature
and also suggest a pattern of suppression based on political activities without
cause, in violation of Article 9 of both the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(UDHR) and the binding International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR), to which Zimbabwe is a State
Party. The police actions, which the civil
society organizations have said was aimed
at suppression of information, targeted
the dissolution of the organizations and
seizure of documents and publications.
This implicates ICCPR obligations under
Articles 19 and 21, which protect the rights
of freedom of association, expression
through the dissemination of opinion and
information, and assembly, and constitutes
political discrimination contrary to Article
1 of the same.
In a process aimed at increasing peace,
democratization, and broader political
involvement, Zimbabwe’s laudable goal of
a constitutional referendum has resulted
in increased suppression of civil society.
These allegations of human rights violations by Zimbabwean authorities put into
question the legitimacy of the constitutional referendum and whether this alone
could solve the institutional defects that
lead to rights violations in Zimbabwe.

Election Reform Shifts 2013 Vote
in Kenya from 2008 Violence
Kenyan voters returned to the polls on
March 4, 2013, for the country’s first general election since a 2008 vote marred by
widespread political violence and claims
of voter fraud and rigged tabulations. Since
that election, Kenya revised its constitution
in 2010 and this was the first test of its
provisions intended as a response to the
aforementioned electoral violence.
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Kenyans voted for the new constitution
in a referendum following a power-sharing
agreement between now outgoing president Mwai Kibaki and career politician
Raila Odinga. In an effort to end postelection violence, Kofi Annan brokered
the agreement, which saw Odinga assuming the position of prime minister while
Kibaki retained the presidency.
Deputy Prime Minister Uhuru
Kenyatta—the ultimate winner of the 2013
vote—is alleged to have had control over
the attacks against Odinga’s political supporters during the violence that followed
the 2008 election. Kenyatta is one of the
wealthiest men in Kenya, and was charged
in the International Criminal Court (ICC)
with financing and directing murder,
forced deportation, sexual violence,
and other inhumane acts—charges that the
pre-trial chamber confirmed in January
2012. Kenyan politics centers around
ethnicities and ethnic alliances, and
violence was directed at opposing ethnic
groups primarily between Kibaki’s Kikuyu
supporters—of which Kenyatta is also a
member—and Odinga’s Luo supporters.
With this history, one primary domestic
and international concern leading up to the
March vote was the validity of the election
results. To this end, the constitution created
the Independent Electoral and Boundaries
Commission (IEBC). The IEBC oversaw
the entire electoral process, and adjudicated any claims of voter fraud. In this
endeavor, the IEBC primarily was tasked
with enforcing regulations of Electoral Act
of 2011. The IEBC decisions and petitions
are then subject to judicial review in the
Supreme Court of Kenya.
The 2013 vote pronounced Kenyatta
the victor with 50.07 percent of the vote to
Odinga’s 43.7 percent. This result avoided
an automatic recount that would be triggered if no candidate received a majority.
Due to the close nature of this result,
however, Odinga and civil society allies
challenged the election results, asserting
that they were again marred by technical problems. The IEBC did direct some
recounts in areas that had been affected
by technical issues; however, these smallscale recounts did not change the initial
results and the IEBC certified the election
on March 9; on March 31 the Supreme
Court upheld the election results.
While some observers have questioned
the IEBC recount process, the functioning
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of the 2013 election and post-election
stands in stark contrast to what occurred
in 2008. On Election Day, there were a
few instances of violence and clashes with
police in Mombasa. The attacks, however,
were perpetrated by a separatist organization—in contrast to the 2008 violence,
which was politically motivated targeting
ethnic groups. The 2013 elections also
saw a concerted effort by Kenyan police
and security forces to increase security
presence at polling stations and in possible
areas of violence. Likewise, no widespread
violence broke out post-election.
Yet the result of the election drew
international attention because it resulted
in victory for a president who is indicted

on charges of international crimes. This
places him in the exclusive company of
Omar al-Bashir of Sudan as ICC-indicted
heads of state. In fact, much of Kenyatta’s
campaign addressed this indictment, and
he rallied support around claims that it was
part of western control of Kenya. While
this has raised some issues around foreign
assistance and diplomatic ties, much of
the possible outcomes will rest on ICC
decisions and possible trials later this year.
While Kenya’s election still revolved
around ethnic identity and alliances with
the candidates, it did mark a turning point
in a country struggling for political legitimacy following the 2008 election violence.
Although the issue of a major western ally
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having an ICC-indicted head of state has
yet to be resolved, the functioning of the
election was for the most part violencefree. The election reaffirmed human rights
obligations of Kenya in both preventing
violence and elections. Kenya fulfilled its
duties to protect citizens from violence
under the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights (UDHR) Articles 3 and 5. This
allowed for Kenya to maintain its citizens’
rights to universal suffrage and having a
voice in governance under UDHR Article
21(1) and (3).
Tyler Addison, a J.D. candidate at the
American University Washington College
of Law, is a staff writer for the Human
Rights Brief.

